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Introduction. Francesco ‘Franz’ Berto is Professor of Philosophy at
the University of Amsterdam. Currently a passionate metaphysician
and an explorer of deviant logics, he started studying Hegelian di-
alectic at the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, tutored and inspired
by Emanuele Severino. At the time, he published La dialettica della
strutturaoriginaria (2003) andChe cos’è ladialetticahegeliana? (2005).
As a postdoc in Padova and, successively, Paris, he obtained the 2007
Castiglioncello Prize for youngphilosopherswith hisTeorie dell’assur
do [English version:HowtoSell aContradiction, 2007]. In 2012hehas
been appointed senior lecturer at the University of Aberdeen, taking
part at Crispin Wright’s research project on the metaphysical basis
of logic and working with Graham Priest on paraconsistent seman-
tics, impossibleworlds, anddialetheism. The results are contained in
Existence as a Real Property (2013) [Italian version: L’esistenza non è
logica (2010)]. Among students, though, he is chiefly well-known for
his textbooks on quantified first-order logic [Logica da zero a Gödel,
2007] andGödel theorems [There’s SomethingAboutGödel: TheCom-
plete Guide to the Incompleteness Theorem, 2009], published in Italy
by Laterza [Tutti pazzi per Gödel: La guida completa al teorema di in-
completezza, 2008]. In the introduction, he declares that he has writ-
ten thebooksmostly inorder topayhis bills. Personally, weareproud
of our economic contribution. We have questioned him on his view
on non-existent objects and on his “impressionistic impressions” on
the reception of Hegel in analytic philosophy.
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Having been concerned with inexistent objects, non-standard logic, (even)
Hegelian dialectic (!), you proved yourself an uncommon, yet extremely in-
teresting philosopher. It shouldn’t be easy to work in isolation with respect to
the more mainstream and fashionable debates. . . Thanks for calling me in-
teresting!
Walking away from established debates can be a lot of fun: it allows you to
explore original paths where less is taken for granted.
So-called analytic philosophy (turbo-capitalistic philosophy, asmyesteemed
colleague Diego Fuffaro would call it https://www.facebook.com/DiegoFuffa)
often takes a lot for granted. Analytic philosophers work comfortably, we may
say in Kuhnian fashion, within customary philosophical paradigms and with-
out asking too many radical questions – until the paradigms enter a phase of
recession.
Somethingof the sort is happeningnowadays inontology–precisely, inmeta-
ontology: the methodology of ontology. Here the Quinean paradigm of the For-
ties was taken for granted for a long time: ontological commitment is captured
by the quantifier (“To be is to be the value of a variable” was one of Quine’s fa-
mous rhetoricalmottos). And the task of ontology is to write down the complete
catalogue of the furniture of the world – of everything there is. Ontology gets the
list right insofar as it includes nothing that isn’t there, and leaves out nothing
that is there. And that’s it.
21st Century ontology is dominated by reactions against such paradigm: gro
unding theorists likeKit Fine, JonathanSchaffer andFabriceCorreia, neo-Meinon
gians like GrahamPriest, fictionalists like Stephen Yablo andHartry Field, quan-
tifier variantists like Eli Hirsch, and ontological pluralists like Jason Turner and
KrisMcDaniel, all claim that there’s something seriouslywrongwith theQuinean
framework. They propose to reform it in various ways, or even to reject it alto-
gether. None of this would have happened if these folks hadn’t felt the need to
walk away from the established path.
In Existence as a Real Property, you write: “It is thanks to Doyle’s creativity as
a fantasy writer, that Holmes is available for reference and quantification at
@” (p. 224). “Creativity” lays the foundations of theComprehensionPrinciple
(UCP), according to which there is an object matching every possible com-
bination of properties. But is the principle really so limitless? For instance,
could Doyle write a story on the adventures of the round square in the actual
world, or would he fall afoul to amodal error? Doyle could certainly do that,
with no modal mistake. Here’s why.
First, your “There is an objectmatching every possible combination of prop-
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(UCP) Any condition A[x] is satisfied by something.
This principle quickly goes down in flames, for it delivers triviality. Let A[x] be:
‘x = x & B’. By UCP, something – say, o – satisfies A[x]. Thus: o = o & B. By
conjunction elimination: B. But B was arbitrary. So one can use UCP to derive
any conclusion one wills!
On the other hand, nobody has ever endorsed the UCP – not even Meinong.
Instead, Modal Meinongianism (MM), the view endorsed by Graham Priest and
myself, subscribe to, is a Qualified Comprehension Principle:
(QCP) Any condition A[x] is satisfied by some object at some world.
And “world” here means any situation or state of affairs, including ones that
could not obtain, that is impossible situations.
Now, something’s being round and square is an impossible situation for sure:
theworld couldnot be like that. But supposeDoylewrites about anactual round
square, that is, something that is characterized by Doyle as round and square at
the actual world @. How does MM handle this?
Easily enough: once ways the world could not be, that is, so-called non-
normalor impossibleworlds (seehttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/impossible-
worlds) are admitted in the semantics, one cannot expect modal operators to
work uniformly across all worlds. And “actually” is one such operator. The truth
and falsity conditions for “actually” given on pp. 175-6 of Existence as a Real
Property (ERP) are as follows. Wherew is a possible world:
‘Actually A’ is true atw iff A is true at @.
‘Actually A’ is false atw iff A is false at @.
If A is false at @, then ‘Actually A’ is not a necessary truth. But whenw is a non-
normal world, A can hold there even if A does not hold at @. So given A[x] = “x
actually is a round square”, we still have, as per the QCP, that something has, at
some world, the property of being a round square at @. But this doesn’t give us
anything which is actually round and square, for the relevant world is a non-
normal one, and the truth conditions above don’t apply there.
The insight is obvious: you can imagine your impossible dreams to be actu-
ally realized, but that doesn’t make them real. What your imagination produces
is only something that is represented as being such-and-so-at-@, but nothing
that is, at @, such-and-so.
The modal semantics developed by you and Graham Priest (2005) allow for
rigid designation (denotation operators have no world-indexes). At the same
time, QCPpossibly assigns every property – ‘of course’ even inconsistent ones
– to some object. There seems to be at least one property, though, such that, if
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are talkingabout self-diversity: x(x , x). For is it right to say that there canbe
noworld inwhichHolmes fails to be identical to itself, on pain of abandoning
rigiddesignation? And thus, doesn’t rigiddesignationvalidate thenecessity of
self-identity, at least in the sense that there is noworld inwhich it doesn’t hold
– even though there are (impossible)worlds inwhich it holds accompanied by
its negation? Yes, MM is perfectly compatible with the necessity of identity:
just have “=” get the same extension/anti-extension at all possible worlds. This
gives you that if a = b , then ‘a = b ’ holds at all possible worlds.
Third, as for rigid designation and the “textbookKripkeanism” story youhave
rehearsed: there being ways the world could not be, such that something is not
self-identical, does not interact with rigid designation at all. Here’s my latest
logical fiction story:
“Nonsy was non-self-identical and this made him very unhappy: he
had donemany different jobs, tried many experiences, met so many
people, still he couldn’t find his identity: ‘Who am I?’ – he kept won-
dering. LuckilyonedayNonsybecame friendswithSelfy, anunselfish
self-identical girl . . . ”
. . .And so on. According to MM, in the above story “Nonsy” rigidly refers to
Nonsy. Of course, Nonsy doesn’t really exist – he’s just a fictional character in-
vented by me. At the actual world, though, Nonsy is perfectly self-identical:
Nonsy just is Nonsy, and nobody else. And so he is at any other possible world:
there is noway theworld could be, such that something fails to be self-identical.
That “Nonsy” designates rigidly simply means that it refers to that guy even
in counterfactual situationswhere he is supposed to have features he doesn’t ac-
tually have. We can, for instance, wonder what Nonsy would do if he fell in love
with Selfy. Nonsy isn’t actually in love with Selfy (he doesn’t really exist, recall?
Nonexistents cannot fall in love). Still we refer toNonsy whenwe use “Nonsy” to
describe the counterfactual situation we are wondering about.
Now, givennon-normalworlds, somecounterfactual situationswill alsobecoun-
terpossible: situations in which Nonsy has properties he cannot have. x(x , x)
is just one such property. The usual textbook-Kripkean story holds: first we fix
the reference of “Nonsy” at the actual world. Then we hold the reference fixed
across nonactual circumstances, including circumstances that couldnot obtain,
aka impossible worlds. Kripke said that we ought to keep our language constant
across alternative worlds. He was, of course, right. There is no incompatibil-
ity between things being non-self-identical in some impossible circumstance or
other, and rigid designation.
It is another issue, how we can actually fix the reference of “Nonsy”. This is,
inmy view, themost serious problemofMM. It is called the Selection Problem. I
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and all bets concerning it are still off.
Ok, we understand that you handle designation as amere semantic clause al-
lowing you to refer toNonsy in everyworld-domain inwhich she (he? neither?
both?) figures. But our textbook-likeKripkean stubbornness (anda gooddeal
of Putnam for dummies, as you certainly guessed) suggests us that it is only
conditionally upon admitting the necessity of self-identity that you can ad-
mit rigid designation, and that the two things are somehow connected – the
former being a necessary condition for the latter. After all, when you baptize
Nonsy (supposing you can) in the actual world, you baptize a necessarily self-
identical thing. Given this relationship, it doesn’t seem to be possible to refer
to him (her?) in contexts where that very Nonsy is not the same thing as itself
– would you really achieve reference? That Nonsy should be self-identical in
everyworld, and that it is odd to utter truths on a non-self identical Nonsy are
at least powerful non-semantic intuitions. . . I think there’s a confusion be-
tween (a) referring at @ to something that, at world w , @, is such-and-so, and
(b) referring atw to something that, at worldw , is such-and-so.
It might be that, in a (closest) worldw where Nonsy is not self-identical (“in
contexts where that very Nonsy is not the same thing as itself”, as you say), we
cannot refer to him, say, because we keep referring to something else (!) or to
nothing at all.
That goes under case (b). So it’s not our problem here at @. We are in case
(a): We can refer to Nonsy at @ (I just did it), as he is perfectly self-identical
around here. We can then describe a counterfactual (indeed, counterpossible)
scenario,w , in which Nonsy is non-self-identical (I did it above). That wewould
have problems in referring to a non-self-identical object in a counterpossible
scenario where there are such things around doesn’t affect our actually referring
to something, which is then represented as non-self-identical in a logical fan-
tasy.
ModalMeinongianmetaphysics seems to lack an important feature: essential
properties. Particularly, your semantics combines rigid designation andUCP,
fromwhichwe can derive that every object can change every property,maybe
even lose its self-identity, by yet ‘remaining’ the same object we are referring
to in the actual world. Does any deflationism about essential properties hide
behind this omission? And if so, howcan it go togetherwith rigid designation?
Luckily, MM is perfectly neutral with respect to essentialism.
MM allows worlds where, for instance, Socrates is an iPhone 6. Essential-
ists may not like this. But they would be wrong. For MM semantics includes
non-normal worlds, which are ways things cannot be. And the theory does not
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Suppose you, qua essentialist, want Socrates to be essentially human. Then
just impose to (the formal language counterpart of) “is human” the constraint
that whatever makes it actually true also makes it true at any possible world
(where the thing exists). Then Socrates, being human, will also be human at
all possible worlds (ditto): situations in which Socrates is a smartphone will be
ruled out from the realm of possibilities.
If, on the other hand, you don’t like Socrates to be essentially human, be-
cause you are an anti-essentialist, just avoid imposing such a constraint. MM
canmake you happy either way.
Can we conceive Socrates as a glossy black new iPhone 6, even if the essen-
tialist supposition that this is not a possible scenario is right? I claim that we
can, but this issue, having to do with the connections between conceivability
and possibility, is a tangled one, and we may avoid getting into this during our
chat.
Right. Please, allow us to change our subject. In the previous discussion, we
talkedaboutcontradiction, andyoudealtwith thisproblembyusingparacon-
sistent logic. In thepast you’vealsoworkedondialectic. Butwhatare themain
differences exactly? Andmore generally, what is the relationship between di-
alectic and formal logic? The interest in dialectic still has an influence, per-
haps subliminally, on your current research, or is it a closed chapter? “Di-
alectic” means lots of different things. If what you have in mind is Hegel’s di-
alectic (or Hegel’s dialectical method, or whatnot) – the relation between that
stuff and formal logic is extremely complicated.
In the Sixties and Seventies, when the interest in Marx’s and Hegel’s thought
was very lively, various people tried to “formalize” Hegel’s dialectic (there’s a
great anthology on this, La formalizzazione della dialettica, edited by one of
my philosophical heroes: Diego Marconi). Some of these formalizations used
paraconsistent logic. The idea was that, since Hegel believed there to be true
contradictions and took them to be essential to his “dialectical method”, we had
better adopt some paraconsistent logic tomake sense of his views. For any non-
paraconsistent logic, in the face of true contradictions, will allow you to infer
that everything is true – and Hegel cannot have been that foolish.
However, thatHegel’s dialectic requires there tobe true contradictions is con-
troversial: Bob Brandom, Diego Marconi, Emanuele Severino, Pirmin Stekeler-
Weithofer, and others, deny this. If they are right, there’s little need for paracon-
sistency to make sense of Hegel’s dialectic.
As for my research on Hegel, I sometimes wish to go back to that. But I have
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IntroducingEmpiricismand the Philosophy ofMind by Sellars, RichardRorty
argues that along with Quine, the later Wittgenstein, and then Brandom and
McDowell there has been a transition of analytic philosophy from an initial
empiricist phase to a Kantian phase, to finally land to Hegel. In this turn,
youwent in the opposite direction, departing fromHegel and arriving to ana-
lyticmetaphysics. Given thehistorical perspective proposedbyRorty, inwhat
would be the originality of analytic philosophy in repeating the same steps?
Ah, the sociology of philosophy is a difficult subject! Well here are my impres-
sionistic impressions, shaped by my personal experience and unsupported by
statistical data.
After having been dipped for some years in the analytic philosophy of the
Anglo-Saxon countries, I’d say that the transition Rorty envisaged hasn’t hap-
pened. The later Wittgenstein is less and less popular in the analytic camp, his
main supporters being nowadays mostly interpreters of Wittgenstein who talk
to each other, rather than people who engage in systematic philosophy.
As for Brandom and McDowell, while their work has had some impact on
so-called continental philosophers and on some analytic folks, their positive in-
fluence on the analytic camp at large has been controversial. Some of the best
analytic philosophers – people like Tim Williamson or my former boss in Scot-
land, CrispinWright – have engagedwith their work, but in a sharply critical way
and in order to essentially dismiss it.
I understand why Rorty would have wished analytic philosophy to follow a
path from Kant, through Hegel, and, possibly, into post-Hegelian and possibly
relativistic thought. But nothing of the sort seems tome to be happening. This is
what is actually happening, according to TimWilliamson’s 2007 The Philosophy
of Philosophy – he speaks of:
[. . . ] the liveliest, exactest, and most creative achievements of the fi-
nal thirdof the [20th]Century: the revival ofmetaphysical theorizing,
realist in spirit, often speculative, sometimes commonsensical, as-
sociated with Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Kit Fine, Peter van Inwagen,
David Armstrong, and many others [. . . ].
On the traditional grand narrative schemes in the history of philos-
ophy, this activity must be a throwback to pre-Kantian metaphysics:
it ought not to be happening – but it is. (p. 19)
As formy going in the non-Rortian direction, that’s purely accidental: I was ini-
tially raised a continental, and heavily trained in the history of philosophy. I
discovered analytic philosophy later. And I have had a lot of fun doing analytic
philosophy, continental philosophy, anything in the middle, and also any phi-
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While the English-speaking world was once again interested in the Hegelian
thought, in your Che cos’è la dialettica hegeliana? [What is Hegelian Dialec-
tic?] you point out that the Italian community continues to believe it best to
avoid even reading it. How do you explain this lack of interest? I guess you
mean the community of Italian philosopherswho consider themselves to be an-
alytic philosophers. I think it’s because the infamous analytic/continental di-
vide is felt more strongly in the countries with a robust continental tradition,
and Italy is one such country. I have experienced a somewhat similar situation
when I was working at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris. You may imag-
ine the early analytic Italian folks from the Seventies and Eighties, trying to es-
tablish themselves as a research community, and the people surrounding them:
neo-idealists, Hegelians, wannabe-Heideggerians, postmodernists, and so on.
Not that analytic philosophers in the US or UK spend their whole day reading
Hegel. But they never had a strong continental counterpart, in their own philos-
ophy departments or in their national cultural milieu at large, against which a
cultural reaction was called for.
Whenyouwereastudentyouhaveexplored theworkofEmanueleSeverino, to
whomyou often recognize your intellctual debt. Do you consider his dialectic
as an evolution of the Hegelian dialectic? And would you wish for a reception
of his thought on the part of the analytic tradition similar to that of Hegel?
I’d say that are various common points between the way I can make sense of
Hegel’s dialectic, and a view Severino labels as “dialectic” in some core chapters
of (what I take to be) his most beautiful book, La struttura originaria. Not sure
if it’s an “evolution”, for this may mean too many things. Certainly, Severino’s
dialectic helped me to understand Hegel’s.
I don’t think there will be any “analytic reception” of Severino’s thought. This
is due to various issues, one being that Severino’s works are accessible almost
only to an Italian readership and Italian is, regrettably, not a very important lan-
guage from the viewpoint of top-level international research. Another issue is
that Severino himself is usually recalcitrant when one tries to propose similari-
ties and affinities between his thought and someone else’s; this has to do partly
with his own philosophy, partly with the man. It’s a pity, but I don’t think I can
do a lot about this.
Byway of consolation, consider thatmany young analytic philosopherswere
raised in Venice, firstly exposed to Severino, still admirers of his work, now pur-
suing brilliant careers of international profile: people like Elia Zardini, Roberto
Loss, Matteo Plebani, and others.
Last question: canwe learn something in advanceonExistence as aRealProp-
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in the actualworld? Ha! Whether ERP II is to remain an unactualized possibile
or not depends on my finding the time to work on that stuff again, and this is
something I cannot predict at the moment. You know what Iris Murdoch once
said? No philosophy book is ever finished: it is only abandoned.
I’m not sure I ever expressed the wish to write a whole book onWittgenstein
(maybe I once did, but I forgot). If I do, I hope I will manage to follow Wittgen-
stein’s own recommendation, according to Malcom’s memoirs: I hope it will be
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